The Lost Volume Seller In English Law
One of the mysteries in life is how different jurisdictions can be faced with the same legal problem and manage to come up with the same wrong answer. Case in point.
Both English and American contract law hold that if a buyer cancels an order (breaches) and the seller resells the item at the same price, the seller's remedy need not be the contract/market differential (zero). Rather, they both say, if the seller could have sold this item and another as well, the seller could have made the profits on both items. The seller would be a "lost volume seller" and, since the breach cost it the profits on the second sale, it should be compensated for the loss of that profit.
In an earlier article on the American law, I argued that this is wrong.
1 When I looked at the English treatises it turned out that they made the same mistakes as the Americans. 2 Their problem is that they both ask the wrong question. If the question were whether the seller did lose something when the buyer breached, the answer would generally be Yes. And since courts in both places frame the legal question as one of making the seller whole, the lost profit remedy seems plausible.
1 Actually, I have made the argument a number of times, the most recent being "The Lost Volume Seller, R.I.P.", 2 Criterion J. on Innovation (2017). Earlier thrusts are Framing Contract Law, ch. 12 (2006) and Rethinking Contract Law, ch. 4 (2015) . §5-39-5-42; 834-35, §25-118-120; pp. 840-841, §25-130-131; pp. 852-53, §26-016. In The Achilleas, 3 Lord Hoffmann said: "It seems to me logical to found liability for damages upon the intention of the parties (objectively ascertained) because all contractual liability is voluntarily undertaken. It must be in principle wrong to hold someone liable for risks for which the people entering into such a contract in their particular market, would not reasonably be considered to have undertaken." 4 The same principle, I suggest, should apply to measuring damages; the lost volume seller fails that test.
A simple example should illustrate the ludicrousness of the lost volume remedy.
Ajax Ltd. is putting the finishing touches on a software package and has lined up a number of customers, one of which is Bell Ltd. Bell has agreed to buy the software program for $100,000 with delivery in one month on June 1. On June 1, the price is still $100,000. Bell reneges on its promise (breaches). The seller would be a lost volume seller-it could have sold this package and another as well. What would be the damages?
The lost volume remedy would award $100,000 minus the but-for costs. Since the product could be delivered over the internet, the but-for costs would be close to zero, 5 and the lost volume damages, therefore, would be $100,000. Would a buyer "voluntarily undertake", to use Lord Hoffmann's phrase, to pay the full price regardless of whether it ultimately decides to take the product? Now, there might be circumstances in which the seller would want some protection from the buyer walking away. If so, it could contract for it, by negotiating a nonrefundable deposit or liquidated damages. It is extremely 4 At 12. 5 If the product were delivered on a number of compact disks, the but-for cost would the price of the disks, the postage, and the packaging, which might amount to a few hundred dollars.
unlikely that there would be circumstances that would have resulted in a negotiated nonrefundable deposit approaching $100,000. That is, the lost volume remedy would result in an absurd contract which no rational buyer would enter into.
In general, after entering into a contract, the buyer has a choice. It can go forward with the purchase or it can terminate (breach). That is, it has an option and the contract determines the price of that option. If the contract did not include an explicit option price, the contract remedy would be the implicit price of the option. If there were not an explicit price, what should the implicit price (the default remedy) be? One alternative is the lost volume profit; the second is the contract/market differential. 6 The software hypothetical suggests that the option price determined by the lost volume measure would result in an absurd contract. I will argue in this paper that the hypothetical carries over to other contexts as well and that the lost volume remedy should be discarded. The test is a simple variant on Lord Hoffmann's question: is the resultant contract absurd? The lost volume profit remedy fails that test. As we shall see, it will typically set damages too high and, worse, it will be perverse, setting the option price high when it should be low and vice versa.
Sophisticated buyers often contract out of the lost volume remedy. It is not easy to document the extent of this, but some insight can be gained by looking at the contracts between American automobile manufacturers and their suppliers. General Motors' standard purchase order, for example, gave the buyer the "option [to] terminate all or any 6 That is the remedy embodied in the Sale of Goods Act 1979, 50(3): "Where there is an available market for the goods in question the measure of damages is prima facie to be ascertained by the difference between the contract price and the market or current price." The hypothetical does not concern goods; however, as Kramer ¶1.20 observes, the common law remedy is similar.
part of this order, at any time and for any reason." 7 GM would compensate the supplier for costs that had been incurred, but there would be no recovery for lost profits. While the practices of other auto manufacturers varied, none would cover R&D and engineering expenses, a significant element of lost profits. 8 I suspect that the procurement contracts of large English manufacturers would also reject the lost profit remedy. The lost profit remedy is basically a trap for the unwary.
The treatises cite only a handful of cases and generally only present the conclusions without getting into the facts. Because the number is so small, a more in depth discussion of the case law is feasible. The dearth of case law is puzzling. Whether it is because defendants routinely pay the damages, sellers choose not to enforce, or because parties contract out of the remedy is not clear.
In Part I, I consider the cases involving the retail sales of consumer durables; the case law has focused almost entirely on automobiles. 9 In Part II, I consider the businessto-business (B2B) cases, which present somewhat different issues.
I. THE CAR CASES
Treitel's treatment is typical:
7 Quoted in my Protecting Reliance, 114 Columbia Law Rev. 1033 , 1055 (2014 14 A second means of effectively raising the price would be for the dealer to charge a deposit. 15 The American natural gas market in the 1970's provides a good illustration.
The prices were fixed by law at a level below the market clearing price. The sellers then responded by requiring that the buyers enter into take-or-pay contracts with a high "take".
That is, the buyer agreed to pay for, say, 80% of the contract quantity regardless of whether it actually took any. 16 If the market were tight (in the misleading language of Treitel and the others, when demand exceeds the dealer's supply), the dealer would set a high deposit. With the deposit the customer, in effect, would be taking an option. It could walk away, forfeiting the deposit, or it could conclude the deal by paying the remainder of the contract price. The tighter the market, the higher the deposit (option price). The lost volume seller framing gets it backward. It sets the option price high when the market is slack and low (or zero) when the market is tight.
The decisions considered none of this. 22 The defense argued that the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, Section 50(3) governed:
"Where there is an available market for the goods in question the measure of damages is prima facie to be ascertained by the difference between the contract price and the market or current price." 23 Since the market and current price were the same, the damages under 50(3) would have been zero.
There followed a long, and rather embarrassing, discussion of whether or not there was an "available market" for Vanguard cars. Invoking Dunkirk Colliery Co. v.
Lever, 24 decided in 1878, the plaintiff argued that available market meant "some place or centre at or through which a seller can reasonably expect to find a purchaser." 25 The court agreed: "it was proved that there is nothing in the nature of a market like a Cotton Exchange or Baltic or Stock Exchange, or anything of the sort, for the sale of new motorcars." 26 So, since there was no available market, Section 50(3) was out.
Having rejected section 50(3), the court concluded that "the plaintiffs lost a sale in the sense that if another purchaser had come into the plaintiffs' premises there was available for that other purchaser a 'Vanguard' car for immediate delivery: so that the 21 [1913] 1 Ch. 465, C.A. 22 The court ignored the most significant American case of that era which rejected the lost volume remedy; see A. Lenobel, Inc. v. Senif, 252 A.D. 533 (Actually, the court found that there was no contract, but, anticipating the possibility of an appeal, it ruled on damages as well). It concluded that there was not an "available market," and therefore found that the buyer had, in effect, agreed to pay 29% of the contract price whether or not it took the dining set. "In the present case the loss suffered by the pursuers is the profit they would have got from the sale of the diningroom suite to the defender, i.e. £49 2s. It is true that both the suite in the window and the suite specially ordered and covered for the defender were sold eventually, but some six months later. One could not possibly say there was an available market for dining-room suites costing £171 in the sense that if one buyer repudiates, another could easily and readily be found. Indeed, if there is not an available market for motor cars, still less is there for dining-room suites. Consequently, if the pursuers are right in their contention that a firm order was given by the defender, it follows that they are entitled to the damages they claim." (At 20) Notice that the court is coy about the final disposition of the car. Jenkins, L.J., began by framing the problem as whether or not supply exceeded demand:
The number of sales he can effect, and consequently the amount of profit he makes, will be governed, according to the state of trade, either by the number of cars he is able to obtain from the manufacturers, or by the number of purchasers he is able to find. In the former case demand exceeds supply, so that the default of one purchaser involves him in no loss, for he sells the same number of cars as he would have sold if that purchaser had not defaulted. In the latter case supply exceeds demand, so that the default of one purchaser may be said to have lost him one sale.
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He then turned to whether there was an available market, concluding that there wasn't one. "If the only price at which a car can be sold is the fixed retail price and no 35 The price was £773 17s and the damage claim was for £97 15s. 36 "No point was made on either side of the fact that the defendant was to give another vehicle in partexchange." At 119. Nevertheless, the facts were clear: " [T] he defendant repudiated the agreement and refused to take delivery because he had found that he could get a better bargain elsewhere for his 'Commer' van which was to be taken in part payment of the price." At 132. involved and the specially ordered goods were altered for resale." As we shall see, the socalled special order was irrelevant-the cost of modification was about 1% of the contract price.
The decision comes down to a literal interpretation of the casual language of a car salesman. Were the Hillman Minx cars on allocation? Surely, there would be better evidence than this. The fact that a competing dealer effectively cut the price (by increasing the price paid for the trade-in) and that the trade-in price was about half the contract price is a lot better evidence. It is not dispositive, but it does suggest that the market was not quite so tight as the judge had concluded. More significantly, the court's framing of the problem was wrong. The question should have been one of pricing the option to terminate. The tighter the market, the greater would be the price of the option.
The dealer could have made that price explicit to the customer by offering a nonrefundable deposit. By framing the question as it did, the court here and in Thompson, did not even ask whether the buyer had made a deposit.
C. Lazenby Garages v. Wright 43
Wright signed a contract to buy a used BMW for £1,670. He told his wife who urged him not to buy it, so the next day he went to the dealer to cancel the order. market, but his conclusion was straight-forward: the car was resold at a profit and the dealer had suffered no damages.
D. Summary
The rote citation of these cases in the treatises perpetuates some of the dubious reasoning in the cases. The "available market" argument was wrong when it first appeared in 1878, archaic when it resurfaced in the 1950's, and an embarrassment today.
The supply and demand language is a sloppy, misleading way to characterize the market.
Car dealers will on occasion find that a particular model is "hot" and the manufacturer will have it on allocation. The dealer would find that it could only sell a fixed maximum 44 At 462.
in any given month. In the 1950's world in which cars were sold under resale price maintenance, the dealer who was so constrained could not directly raise the price, but it could raise the price indirectly and one way of doing so would be to set a high nonrefundable deposit (an option price). Today the constraints on the dealer's pricing are not so tight. Still, the deposits are likely to be greater the tighter the market. In the absence of an explicit option price, contract law provides a default rule. The lost volume remedy for the car dealer sets an option price that is unknown to the buyer, that is almost certainly too high, and that is perverse, setting the price high when the market is slack and low (or zero) when the market is tight. By sticking to the contract/market differential, (likely zero), the law would force the dealer to make the option price explicit with a nonrefundable deposit.
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II. THE B2B CASES
For a retailer the lost profit was simply the difference between the wholesale and retail price; for new automobiles sold under resale price maintenance, it was a fixed markup (10% in the first case and 12.5% in the second). For business-to-business cases the lost profits are less clear-cut; they are the difference between the contract price and the but-for costs. If the seller had a substantial investment in physical plant or was in a research-intensive business, the lost profits could easily exceed 50% of the contract price.
That would mean, in effect, that when the parties entered into the contract, the buyer had agreed to pay over 50% of the contract price for the option to buy the product for the difference. Recall the software hypothetical in the Introduction where virtually all the seller's costs would be incurred independently of this particular sale.
Again, only a handful of cases show up in the treatises. The core cases are almost a century old.
A. In Re Vic Mill
The case generally recognized as the fount of the lost volume profit remedy is
In Re Vic Mill. 46 Vic Mill, which was in voluntary liquidation, had ordered a number of machines from the seller, but had cancelled before delivery. One group of machines had already been produced. These were resold, with minor alterations and at a loss. The alterations cost £5 and the loss on resale was £23. Since the sale price for this group of machines was £465, the alteration costs were trivial. 47 The registrar held that the seller's loss was the alteration cost plus the loss on resale, £28. He was reversed by the trial judge, and the reversal was upheld on appeal. Instead, the court awarded lost profits-35% of the contract price (£163).
For those machines on which production had not yet begun, "the registrar was of opinion that the claimants were entitled to have the prospective profits taken into account, but having regard to the circumstances he did not think that the loss directly and naturally resulting from the breach of contract amounted to anything approaching the whole of such prospective profit, and he assessed the damages for these items at 250l." 48 The trial judge reversed this as well and, again, his opinion was upheld on appeal. The total lost profits on the units not yet produced, according to the court, were £1002, roughly 17% of the contract price. The profits on the different items varied from about 3% to 55%; the claimed lost profit on the major items, ring frames, (90% of the total dollar value) was about 15%.
The court found that the sellers had sufficient capacity to produce goods for this contract and for others. 49 Rejecting the registrar's conclusion that the remedy should take account of Vic Mill's mitigation, the court articulated the lost volume argument:
The fallacy of that is in supposing that the second customer was a substituted customer, that, had all gone well, the makers would not have had both customers, both orders, and both profits. In fact, what they did, acting reasonably, and I think very likely more than reasonably in the interests of the Vic Mill, was to content themselves with earning the profit on the second contract at the cost of adapting the machines, which has been taken at 5l.; but they are still losers of the profit which they would have made on the Vic Mill contract, because they could, if they had been minded, have performed both the contracts, and have made the profit on 48 At 467. 49 "The evidence on the affidavits fairly taken is evidence that the claimants' works were sufficiently large and their equipment sufficiently ample to have enabled them to perform this contract in addition to all the others that they did perform." (At 472). In both cases the courts framed the question as whether the seller had adequate capacity to sell additional units; if it did, then it could receive the profit (price less but-for cost) on the sale that was lost. Hill's majority held that whether it had adequate capacity was a fact question, although it is not entirely clear which party bore the burden of proof.
The fact question in both cases was a red herring: did the seller have the capacity to produce the cancelled order and another order of equal magnitude at the same time? By arguing that the court should not ask that question Lord Dunedin was right, albeit for the wrong reason. Because of the way they framed the legal issue, neither court stepped back to ask whether the contract that they had constructed made any sense.
D. B2B Rentals
Two other cases, both concerning the repudiation of an equipment rental agreement, are recognized in the treatises, Interoffice Telephone Ltd. v. Robert Freeman Co. Ltd. 62 and Robophone Facilities Ltd.v. Blank. 63 Each agreement had a clause specifying damages in the event that the lessee terminated prematurely. In one case, the court rejected the termination price as an unenforceable penalty, but not in the other.
The Interoffice agreement, entered into in 1950, was for twelve years. Interoffice would install and maintain a telephone system. In 1956 the lessee was required to abandon its office and, since its new office already had an installed telephone system, it The trial judge concluded that this was a penalty. He held that the plaintiff had a duty to mitigate by hiring out the equipment to someone else, so it restricted the period for recovery to six months. The lost rent, he concluded, was £130. Adding in the cost of removing the installation and other expenses resulted in an award of £338.
The Court of Appeal agreed that it was a penalty, but disagreed on the damage measure, citing Vic Mill and Thompson. While those cases involved the sale of goods, the court concluded that they applied to the rental as well. "Whether it be a hiring agreement or a contract for the sale of goods, where the purchaser has failed to take delivery, the defaulting party must contemplate that damages will vary according to the state of the market, including questions of supply and demand." 65 The court rejected an earlier case,
British Stamp and Ticket Automatic Delivery Co. Ltd. v. Haynes, 66 that awarded rent for a reasonable time after the termination. Since the evidence indicated that Interoffice had enough telephone units to complete this contract and still rent units to another client, 67 the court concluded that it had lost profits. To calculate those profits the court began with the damages defined by clause 8 (future rental stream less 15%) and subtracted "the depreciated value the sum of £700, which was given in evidence as the cost to the plaintiffs of a similar installation, less the sum of £200 representing, not as a matter of strict calculation but as a matter of round figure, the cost of reconditioning the installation." 68 Subtracting this from the "penalty" yielded lost profits of £543.
Robophone involved an agreement to install a telephone answering system. The hirer, Mr. Blank, was an accountant who, it appears, was a one-man firm with little legal knowledge. Lord Denning, in dissent, summarized the problem:
The facts of this case are startling. The plaintiffs say that the machine cost them £105 to manufacture. A salesman called on a customer and got him to sign a printed form agreeing to hire it for seven years. Eleven days later, before the machine was delivered or installed, the customer repented and cancelled it. They accepted the cancellation and did not deliver it. Yet he has been ordered to pay damages of £245 14s. in respect of a machine he the plaintiff had an unlimited stock; they would not be able to relet to anyone else and therefore would be entitled to the lost profits with no mitigation. Third, "If the machines were a sound commercial venture, and the plaintiffs, as good traders, carried sufficient stock to meet current demands, and no more (adjusting their orders to their manufacturers accordingly), then the plaintiffs would not suffer much damage from Mr. Blank's repudiation. They could take this machine back into stock, and relet it in a few weeks to one of their customers at the same rental. . . . Their damage would be the loss of rental for the few weeks pending the reletting to another customer."
72
He then invoked Hadley v. Baxendale, arguing that those damages "arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from the breach" 73 fell in the third category. The other two were "special circumstances which cannot reasonably be supposed to be within the contemplation of the parties unless they were known to both."
74
He distinguished Interoffice, claiming that in this case there was evidence that the plaintiff held sufficient stock to meet any demand.
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Lord Diplock also framed the question as one of whether the plaintiff lost an additional rental:
The judge, I think we must accept, was satisfied on the evidence that their facilities for manufacture exceeded, and were likely to continue to exceed, the demand from potential hirers. They were in effect in the position of a riding-stable proprietor who has in his stable, or in his adjacent paddock, Hadley. However, he dealt with Lord Denning's Hadley concerns by arguing that the risk of the special circumstances occurring were assigned to the defendant when it agreed to the liquidated damages formula.
[T]he defendant's conduct in entering into the contract without disclaiming liability for the enhanced loss which he can foresee gives rise to the implication that he undertakes to bear it. . . . And so if at the time of the contract the plaintiff informs the defendant that his loss in the event of a particular breach is likely to be £X by describing this sum as liquidated damages in the terms of his offer to contract, and the defendant expressly undertakes to pay £X to the plaintiff in the event of such breach, the clause which contains the stipulation is not a "penalty clause" unless £X is not a genuine and reasonable estimate by the plaintiff of the loss which he will in fact be likely to obtain. which make the loss likely to be £X rather than some lesser sum which it would be likely to be in the ordinary course of things.
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The majority asked whether the liquidated damages clause was a genuine and reasonable estimate of the loss. It did not consider the possibility of mitigation, assuming instead that Robophone had lost profits. It reckoned those profits as being between 47%
and 58% of the future rental stream. 78 Since the liquidated damage clause set damages at 50% of the future revenue stream, the majority concluded that it was a reasonable estimate.
Unlike the sale of goods cases, both these decisions recognized that the contracts explicitly priced the buyer's termination. The cost to Sony of the lost cards was £56,246; the market price was £289,170; and the contract price, which had been heavily discounted to a large buyer, Game, was £187,989. The parties framed the damage issue as a choice between the first and third. In the cited lost volume cases the argument was, as described above, that if the seller had the capacity to fill the additional orders, then it would be entitled to the profits it would have received on both the additional sale and on the lost sale. In this case, the argument flipped. If Sony did not replace the lost cards, then it lost the profit on them. Cinram's counsel claimed that the evidence was that Sony's sales had been replaced and "thus had not been lost, it must follow that Sony had earned its profit and so was entitled only to the cost price of the lost goods." 82 Sony argued, and the trial judge agreed, "that on the balance of probabilities these sales were not replaced. There is no suggestion that in the circumstances Sony were able or minded to divert orders placed by other customers to satisfy the loss of these cards to Game." 83 Rix, LJ, placed the burden of proof on the defendant:
[I]f the defendant wishes to say that the loss is less because the profit could have been earned in any event by a substitute or replacement sale, at the cost only of the expenditure of a lesser sum for the purpose of manufacturing or buying in further goods, then the defendant bears the burden of proving that case. It is not for the claimant to prove a negative, that he has not recouped the profit by a substitute sale, but for the defendant to prove a positive, that the profit has been recouped and thus the loss of profit not suffered after all.
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He concluded that "the burden of proof, for the purpose of proving that there had in fact been substitute replacement sales on which Sony had recouped its lost profit, rested on were Game, which had received a substantial discount, the option price would have been 70% of the contract price. 86 For a buyer that had agreed to pay the full price, the option price would have been substantially higher, 80%. 87 It would make no sense for a buyer to agree to pay an option price of 70-80% for the right to buy the goods for the remaining 20-30% of the price, especially since the remedy presumes that an adequate supply of the goods was available.
If the lost volume framing yields an absurd result in its natural habitat, why should it do any better in this context? It shouldn't. The question of whether Sony could have, or did, replace the goods should have been irrelevant. The problem arises in any contract between two parties in a distribution chain. Consider, for example, the simple case in which a car dealer enters into a contract to sell a car, but before the risk of ownership shifts to the buyer, the car is stolen. Putting the problem in the retail versus wholesale price highlights the problem; the argument goes through in a case like the present one in which the difference is between the seller's but-for costs and the price 86 (187, 246 89 The lost volume remedy sets an option price that would usually be too high; sophisticated buyers would most likely contract out of it. Moreover, it is perverse. Buyers would choose to pay higher deposits the tighter the market. But the tighter the market, the lower would be the lost volume profit remedy.
